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The main purpose of this article consists in making a reflection on the relations between the planning 
decisions on urban form and the interests of the different agents involved in development processes 
(where the economic interests stand out) and respective impact on urban land rent and, therefore, on 
proper real estate values. 
The increasing economic pressures on urban morphologies and building typologies simultaneously 
influence and are influenced by planning processes and practices. Contrary to what currently occurs in 
planning frameworks, economic issues are rarely dealt with in Portuguese plans. Thus the author 
contends that plans should cease to be strictly-focused on physical concerns, and enlarge their scope 
for intervention. She argues that physical and economic issues shouldn’t proceed different ways in 
planning, and proposes that plans should include measures to assess the economic impact they exert 
on urban realities and vice versa. Some proposals are made for these measures, based on econometric 
procedures, in order to generate alternative analysis and feasible surplus values taxation devices, 
complying with morphological and typological patterns of land use, but strengthening synergistic 
development processes. 
 
Keywords: urban land rent; land and real estate agents; surplus values; economic impacts of planning; 
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1 Introduction 
Social life of individuals proceeds through a set of inter-relations with spatial expression (Santo, 
2006). Territory is a first-order good and, within this scope, local territorialities assume increasing 
relevance. 
Municipal decision-makers have been intervening in property markets in order to foster private free 
initiative, through concession of permits and provision of favourable development conditions. But 
territorial users are becoming more and more dependent on state and municipal institutions, and on 
concessionary firms that explore infrastructures and services networks (Pardal, 2004) that, in 
practical matters, charge monopoly prices and rents (Pardal, 2006b). Despite property markets are 
strongly shaped by territorial plans, and by the intervention of those organisms, the urbanism 
shouldn’t be mastered by a strictly market rationale, as it is a public service under the auspices of 
the state and of the municipalities (Pardal, 2003). Besides, whenever municipal powers take 
planning decisions, whether at the level of plans or planning processes – concerning land use 
changes, urban perimeters, land property division; increases in the number of autonomous plots, 
expansion of building capacity, and public works - they potentially trigger effects on land uses and 
respective values. 
Within this context, the public administration holds the responsibility to provide land for the different 
kinds of uses (Pardal, 2006a), making sure that their decisions don’t benefit certain groups at the 
expense of the general social interest. A strategic territorial management is required, that includes a 
whole inter-related assessment of engineering, economics, and law perspectives (Santo, 2006), as 
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a guarantee of justice, trust and technical and scientific accuracy. Thus changes in land uses and 
respective intensities should be monitored and rendered operational, in order to articulate 
sustainable economic and social policies. These interventions involve the development of a set of 
tools to monitor and control property price levels (and respective evolution) by municipal powers, 
based on the comprehension of its structure, operation and local characteristics. 
 
2 Bibliographic framework 
 
2.1 The interests of the different agents in property markets 
The production and allocation of urban space result from the inter-relations of complex decisions 
taken by different economic agents. The search for land – and its price – depends on anticipated 
space needs for family lodging, and for industrial, trade, and services activities. So the analysis of 
the roles played by the different property agents1 becomes increasingly important. 
In order to increase land values, landowners often resort to hoarding and land differentiation 
strategies. Development agents, promoters and builders operate at the production and trade 
stages, in order to reach as much profit as they manage to. Real estate agents, valuers, 
consultants and other professionals foster trade volume and efficiency through the articulation 
between buyers and sellers, as they render easier the circulation of information concerning real 
estate availability, characteristics and location. Final consumers (whether owners or leaseholders) 
worry about real estate quality and prices. Credit institutions, by their turn, perform a cash-flow 
regulation role within property markets. Finally, regional and local authorities are responsible for the 
application of laws and regulations; for tax collection, for control over land use changes and 
respective intensities, and for decisions on investments in infrastructures, equipments and public 
spaces. 
Municipal interventions foster urban development processes, and render flexible their administrative 
control. However, they are also pressured by prevailing political and economic forces (Feagin, 
1982, 1983; Form, 1954; Rydin, 1984; Short et al., 1986; Tang et al., 2000). Sometimes agents try 
to escape from the strict application of planning and fiscal regulations, and enter into negotiations 
with the authorities in order to change zoning borders and land use parameters, to transfer 
development rights, or to slack tax collection (Wakeford, 1990). The proper characteristics of the 
property markets – namely the limited number of trade participants, the lack of transparency and a 
certain monopoly degree detained by some market agents - cherish these behaviours. All these 
reasons together nourish speculative processes, and lead the majority of surplus-values generated 
by planning administrative decisions to escape authorities, not being allocated for the general social 
interest. 
 
2.2 The absence of economic concerns in Portuguese territorial plans 
Portuguese territorial plans have systematically ignored the operation of property markets2 (Pardal, 
2006a), and the effects they exert on these markets, namely in what concerns: (i) demand and 
supply segmentation, (ii) the formation of land and real estate prices; and (iii) how land should 
perform its social function, respecting property rights (Pardal, 2006b). There exists a high search for 
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new territorial forms; rules concerning the creation, computation and distribution of surplus values 
aren’t accurately settled; and the planning system doesn’t clearly delimitate central and local remits 
(both of them depend on discontextualised and arbitrary technical views). Thus the assignment of 
uses, the formation of values, and the appropriation of land become obscure, and many interests 
operate on the margin of law, what entangles in market uncertainty and distrust. On the one hand 
landowners search for the maximum profit when they sell land to developers, what increases the 
latter’s risk. On the other hand, promoters also try to appropriate as much surplus-values as 
possible, what is supported on proper legislation. The state and municipalities – through taxation – 
and banks – through credit systems – also look forward to appropriate surplus values on their 
behalf (Pardal et al., 1996). 
 
2.3 How planning can retrieve surplus values 
Planning interventions on property markets (Dunse and Jones, 2002) are performed through 
planning, regulations, administrative proceedings, or fiscal mechanisms. These interventions are 
implemented through (Ihlanfeldt and Raper, 1990; Rebelo, 2009, 2010): zoning ordinances; legal 
incentives or restrictions; property taxation; control over land use changes; urbanization costs; and 
decisions on investments on infrastructures, equipments and public spaces. As these interventions 
rule development processes (Ihlanfeldt and Raper, 1990), they impact on the physical form, the 
urban morphologies and the building typologies, as well as on the economic-territorial distribution. 
Zoning policies (Ihlanfeldt and Raper, 1990) shape real estate supply, namely through either the 
prohibition or promotion of respective concentration, or through raised urbanization costs – that 
may result either from the shortage of proper land, or from the lack of infra-structured land. The 
United States of America, Canada and several Latino-American countries manage to indirectly 
control real estate price and rent levels (Rebelo, 2009) through the application of different surplus 
values taxation mechanisms, and different urban policy regulation tools. Incentive or restriction 
policies, control over land use changes, urbanization costs or investment decisions – implemented, 
namely, through fiscal incentives, zoning or building regulations, and subsidy awarding to 
encourage real estate investment in certain spaces -, besides regulating the capital flow between 
the economic cycles, guide private investments to certain locations and respective neighbourhoods, 
thus conditioning respective profitability (Hanink and Cromley, 1998; Feagin, 1983). 
The value of a certain land plot is shaped both by plans and by the economic dynamics. Thus it 
comprises a territorial-based component (that depends on its juridical status, location, dimension, 
and use authorized by territorial plans), and another component that results from the investments of 
its owner (Lee, 2003; Arnott and Petrova, 2006; Pardal, 2004, 2006a). The territorial-based value 
depends on the land use policy that rules the juridical, economic, administrative and functional land 
appropriation, and settles the reasonable price that should be supported by its use (Lee, 2003; 
Pardal, 2004, 2006a). 
The pure surplus values correspond to the accrued value of a plot that results from the 
administrative remit to decide on urbanization programmes (that correspond to the qualification of 
territorial systems), but part of them may translate profits or property valuations that result from 
owner’s investments (Pardal et al., 1996). It consists in ascribing it an index expressed as a building 
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area, or as the number of autonomous parcels for housing, offices or trade purposes, and it can 
only be assessed for specific plots, within a determinate market context. Public works may also 
potentially engender increases in real estate values3. 
When public entities buy land that, afterwards, develop and send at public auctions, they manage to 
keep beforehand4 the surplus values generated by their own decisions on behalf of the general 
social interest. This procedure disciplines urban growth, balances land markets, and doesn’t trigger 
conflicting situations (Pardal et al, 1996). However, if the production of development land ceases to 
be the sole responsibility of public administration, then it faces greater difficulties to rule land 
markets and urban growth, and consequently looses its ability to keep the resulting surplus values. 
In the current system, where the majority of development initiatives are lead by private agents, 
surplus values merge with costs of infrastructures and with additional profits, thus its effective 
retention for the general social benefit isn’t possible any more (Pardal, 2004, 2006a), what is often 
worsen by difficulties to distinguish rent from profit (Pardal et al., 1996). 
In many European countries, speculative prices are kept under control through land exchange: 
municipalities provide land plots when alternative market plots reach excessive high prices 
(Correia, 1993). 
In property markets, surplus values may be retrieved through taxation (Smolka and Amborski, 
2003). As this process is prone to engender unbalanced situations as compared with the taxation of 
other property assets, its justification funds, on the one hand, on the guarantee of possession rights 
given by the public administration to landowners and, on the other hand, on the services rendered 
by infrastructures´ maintenance, and on the support to the settlement structure that justifies land 
use and economic value. From this perspective, property taxes rely on the benefits attached to 
each kind of property, and depend on its territorial-based value. In the United States of America, 
Canada and Latino-American countries different surplus values appropriation tools, as well as 
urban planning regulation tools, are used by public administration. They span from traditional taxes 
to urbanization fees, in varying percentages, according to countries (Smolka and Amborski, 2003).  
In order to make sure of the neutrality of owners´ interests in relation to uses or intensity of uses 
proposed in plans, the surplus-values tax should solely have an effect on the territorial-base value 
(that is independent from investments and improvements that result from the owner’s initiatives). So 
a balanced land use policy should proceed that allows the settlement of parameters, the monitoring 
and control of surplus values´ creation and distribution, avoiding and fighting against speculative 
behaviours (Pardal, 2004, 2006a, 2006b). The amounts that add or decrease to the plot value as a 
consequence of use classifications, of building coefficients, or of other ruling factors that accrue 
from plans or decisions that impact property values should be clearly defined (Pardal et al., 1996; 
Pardal, 2006a, 2006b). Also real estate prices should be kept under control, thus avoiding the 
opportunistic appropriation of speculative profits by promoters (Arnott and Petrova, 2006; Lee, 
2003; Pardal, 2006a, 2006b). If these transparent procedures aren’t issued, the political, technical 
and administrative agents that intervene in land use regulation and licensing will strive against one 
another for changes in land use and respective intensities (Pardal, 2006a). 
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3 A methodological proposal to compute surplus values 
In order to ensure the availability of land for the different functional uses at reasonable prices, 
avoiding the generation of excessive profits in property markets, and guaranteeing the neutrality of 
landowners´ interests, planning should intervene on property laws, and develop property 
assessment tools for any places, uses and intensities of use, at any time. 
Herein is exposed a methodology that enables the assessment and quantification of surplus values, 
in order to support more efficient urban planning interventions in monitoring, evaluation, control, 
taxation, and distribution of surplus-values engendered by territorial plans and regulations. This 
methodology consists, on the one hand, of the development and implementation of a management 
information system, and on the other, of the development of an original way to compute surplus 
values and additional profits in land aimed at different functional uses, based on a hedonic model 
for real estate and on average development costs (Figure 1): 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model to compute the extra-profit and surplus values that accrue from planning decisions. 
 
The management information system developed and implemented in the research reported in this 
article is made up by the following four databases: 
1. Database on land parcels, that enables the monitoring of the majority of variables 
concerning land characteristics and uses allowed by territorial plans and other land use 
policy tools. It includes the following indicators: dimension of the plots; geomorphologic 
characteristics; absolute and relative location in relation to the main centres and sub-
centres; licensed land use; (current or anticipated) property division; (real or anticipated) 
Modules developed in the interactive model
Proposed and implemented databases
Simulation and display interfaces developed in geographic information systems
Database on urban 
indicators
Database on real estate 
characteristics and 
location
Database on land 
parcels
Database on 
average 
development costs
Hedonic model for the 
appraisal of real estate 
market prices/m2
Model for the Computation 
of additional profits and 
surplus values
Computation of the different kinds 
of costs involved in development 
processes
Surplus values taxation 
settled on a local basis
Interactive 
simulation and 
display module (in 
geographic 
information 
systems)
E Malcata Rebelo  Urban form versus economic interests: un unstable balance 
 
324
taxes; and indirect surplus-values that accrue from infrastructures, equipments, public 
services and other undertakings. 
2. Database on urban indicators, that include indicators that shape real estate supply, 
demand and prices (some accrue from market operation and others are under municipal 
authorities´ control): geo-referenced location of real estate units; applicable planning rules 
(concerning, namely, zoning ordinances and land use coefficients); location indexes of 
different kinds of functions (that show their relative spatial concentration as compared with 
the whole territory); weighted distance to the main urban centres; tendency that activities 
exhibit to remain in the same location, or to change to a new location; public investments 
in communications and transports; culture, sports and leisure time; public health utilities; 
environment; education; housing; economic development and tourism; civil protection; 
social action; and urbanistic qualification; number and density of inhabitants in each block; 
and date. 
3. Database on average development costs, that includes land acquisition and related 
costs; urbanization costs; building costs; management, administrative and marketing 
costs; financial costs; and property taxes: 
 Building land costs/m2 are computed taking as a base the selling prices 
of plots for housing traded at public auction – which approach land 
prices for social uses. These prices are, then, weighted according to the 
average percentage that land for different functional uses (for industrial, 
trade or services purposes) exceed land for housing purposes. Land 
acquisition costs include other parcels, expressed as percentages of 
building land costs/m2: municipal transfer tax (10%); stamp duty (0.4%); 
property registration costs (0.5%); notarized costs (0.5%); and lawyer 
honoraries (0.5%). 
 Development costs/m2, that represents the costs of land infrastructures 
and participation in public investments, are computed according to the 
municipal tax on urban infrastructures. 
 Building costs/m2 include not only proper construction costs (that 
approach selling prices/m2 of common housing, annually published as a 
decree in the government diary), but also costs of equipments (heating 
systems, lifts and special foundations); building honoraries; different 
contingent costs (that generally go up to 5% of the total costs); and 
building inflation. 
 Management, administrative and marketing costs/m2 were assumed to 
amount to 0.8% of total construction costs/m2. It was additionally 
considered a 20% added value rate upon those costs. 
 As far as financial costs/m2 are concerned, it was considered a 6.2% 
rate of annual capital cost, and 50% of borrowed capital for land 
acquisition purposes, and 50% of borrowed capital for commercialization 
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purposes (commercialization costs were assumed to amount to 0.5% of 
total building costs). 
 The municipal tax on property depends on the kind of use5. 
4. Database on real estate characteristics and location, that gathers systematized 
information on the characteristics, location, morphology, typology, and kinds of uses of 
real estate units and respective buildings. 
 
The planning regulations and restrictions allow the construction of a certain area or volume in each 
land plot. The total expected income may be computed by the product between the total allowed 
building area and the selling price of the real estate product/m2. According to the functional use, 
characteristics and location, the selling price/m2 may be anticipated by a hedonic model that 
expresses it as a function of the indicators systematised in the urban management information 
system (Rebelo, 2009; 2010). This model easily fits new and upgraded information, thus it may be 
reformulated and used as a continuous monitoring system. 
The difference between the land market value and the land cost based on public auction sales of 
land plots with similar characteristics and locations includes two distinct components: the additional 
profit (difference between the land patrimonial value6 and the land cost based on public auction 
sales), and the surplus value (difference between the land market value and respective patrimonial 
value). The land market value is given by the difference between the total expected income and the 
set of anticipated urbanization, construction, management, administrative marketing, and financial 
costs, taxes and a normal profit margin, and expressed as a multiple of those total costs7) (Rebelo, 
2003, 2009). The patrimonial value of building land is computed according to the municipal tax on 
property8 (Rebelo, 2009): it is given by the sum of the value of the buildings´ implantation land with 
the value of building-adjacent land. The value of buildings´ implantation surface, by its turn, spans 
between 15% and 45% of building costs (this percentage already includes the location 
characteristics). 
 
4 Case study: the office market in Oporto city 
The developed hedonic model expresses offices selling price/m2 as a function of the following 
urbanistic variables (see Rebelo, 2009, 2010): spatial location of offices; zoning and land use 
coefficients; location indexes of office activities; weighted distance to the most recent business 
district (located on Rotunda of Boavista); temporal inertia of the activities (tendency they have to 
stay in the same location); public investments; number of people working in the upper tertiary 
sector; and date.  
In Table 1 is presented an excerpt of the database of the different costs involved in offices 
urbanization and building processes in Oporto city: 
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Table 1. Different kinds of costs/m2 involved in land acquisition and building of offices, according to 
their location in Oporto city (excerpt of the database) 
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95 RUA JOAO 
BAPTISTA 
LAVANHA R 
241,5 24,2 1,0 1,2 1,2 1,2 0,2 31,5 302,0 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 9,4 0,1 9,4 0,8 774,6 
94 ALAMEDA ECA 
QUEIROS AL 211,5 21,2 0,8 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 268,4 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,3 0,1 8,4 0,770 740,0 
9 LARGO ADRO LG 281,5 28,2 1,1 4 1,4 1,4 0,2 31,5 346,8 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 10,7 0,1 10,8 0,770 820,8 
7762 ESTRADA 
CIRCUNVALACAO 
EST 
226,0 22,6 0,9 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 284,6 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,8 0,1 8,9 0,770 756,7 
7742 ESTRADA 
CIRCUNVALACAO 
EST 
226,0 22,6 0,9 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 284,6 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,8 0,1 8,9 0,770 756,7 
686 RUA TENENTE 
VALADIM R 290,0 29,0 1,2 1,5 1,5 1,5 0,2 31,5 356,3 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 11,0 0,1 11,1 0,770 830,6 
67 RUA INFANTE 
SANTO R 241,5 24,2 1,0 1,2 1,2 1,2 0,2 31,5 302,0 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 9,4 0,1 9,4 0,770 774,6 
646 RUA PROF 
CORREIA ARAUJO 
R 
211,5 21,2 0,8 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 268,4 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,3 0,1 8,4 0,770 740,0 
582 RUA ALEGRIA 
R 226,0 22,6 0,9 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 284,6 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,8 0,1 8,9 0,770 756,7 
54 PRACA FLORES 
PC 281,5 28,2 1,1 1,4 1,4 1,4 0,2 31,5 346,8 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 10,7 0,1 10,8 0,8 820,8 
48 LARGO 
FONTINHA LG 281,5 28,2 1,1 1,4 1,4 1,4 0,2 31,5 346,8 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 10,7 0,1 10,8 0,770 820,8 
46 CAMPO 
MARTIRES PATRIA 
CPO 
281,5 28,2 1,1 1,4 1,4 1,4 0,2 31,5 346,8 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 10,7 0,1 10,8 0,770 820,8 
399 RUA ALEGRIA 
R 226,0 22,6 0,9 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 284,6 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,8 0,1 8,9 0,770 756,7 
370 RUA EUGENIO 
CASTRO R 290,0 29,0 1,2 1,5 1,5 1,5 0,2 31,5 356,3 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 11,0 0,1 11,1 0,770 830,6 
305 PRACA PEDRA 
VERDE PC 205,0 20,5 0,8 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,2 31,5 261,1 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,1 0,1 8,2 0,770 732,5 
300 RUA EUGENIO 
CASTRO R 290,0 29,0 1,2 1,5 1,5 1,5 0,2 31,5 356,3 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 11,0 0,1 11,1 ,770 830,6 
26 LARGO PROF 
ABEL SALAZAR LG 281,5 28,2 1,1 1,4 1,4 1,4 0,2 31,5 346,8 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 10,7 0,1 10,8 0,770 820,8 
256 ALAMEDA ECA 
QUEIROS AL 211,5 21,2 0,8 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 268,4 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,3 0,1 8,4 0,770 740,0 
250 RUA SOEIRO 
MENDES R 205,0 20,5 0,8 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,2 31,5 261,1 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,1 0,1 8,2 0,770 732,5 
216 PRACA PEDRA 
VERDE PC 205,0 20,5 0,8 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,2 31,5 261,1 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,1 0,1 8,2 0,770 732,5 
194 ALAMEDA ECA 
QUEIROS AL 211,5 21,2 8 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 268,4 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,3 0,1 8,4 0,770 740,0 
191 PRACA PEDRA 
VERDE PC 205,0 20,5 0,8 1,0 1,0 1,0 0,2 31,5 261,1 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,1 0,1 8,2 0,770 732,5 
174 CAMPO 
MARTIRES PATRIA 
CPO 
281,5 28,2 1,1 1,4 1,4 1,4 0,2 31,5 6,8 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 10,7 0,1 10,8 0,770 820,8 
130 ALAMEDA ECA 
QUEIROS AL 211,5 21,2 0,8 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 268,4 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,3 0,1 8,4 0,770 740,0 
116 PRACA 226,0 22,6 0,9 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 284,6 415,0 43,8 458,8 7 8,8 0,1 8,9 0,770 756,7 
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MARQUES 
POMBAL PC 
11 LARGO JOSE 
MOREIRA SILVA 
LG 
226,0 22,6 0,9 1,1 1,1 1,1 0,2 31,5 284,6 415,0 43,8 458,8 3,7 8,8 0,1 8,9 0,770 756,7 
 
Unit: euros 
 
In Table 2 is presented the computation of the additional profits and surplus values for some 
selected offices in Oporto city, according to their location: 
 
Table 2. Computation of the additional profits and surplus values in some selected offices in Oporto 
city (excerpt from the database) 
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8 RUA BRAS CUBAS R 5 1,85 1052,4 1169,3 855,5 211,5 705,1 493,6 150,4 
57 RUA FLORES R 5 1,85 858,0 953,3 691,4 281,5 653,1 371,6 38,3 
55 RUA DR RICARDO JORGE R 5 1,85 1377,0 1530,0 1268,1 281,5 659,2 377,7 608,9 
49 RUA FORMOSA R 5 1,85 1429,5 1588,3 1285,4 226,0 659,5 433,5 625,9 
455 COMBATENTES GRANDE GUERRA 
AVE 
5 1,85 1160,3 1289,2 975,5 211,5 705,8 494,3 269,7 
433 RUA NOSSA SENHORA FATIMA R 5 1,85 1436,0 1595,6 1340,0 290,0 637,4 347,4 702,6 
411 RUA CASTELOS R 5 1,85 1362,1 1513,5 1290,5 290,0 753,8 463,8 536,7 
393 RUA ALEGRIA R 5 1,85 1472,4 1636,0 1332,9 226,0 696,5 470,5 636,4 
35 RUA LIMA JUNIOR R 5 1,85 1284,0 1426,7 1074,0 159,0 756,2 597,2 317,8 
2533 FERNAO MAGALHAES AVE 5 1,85 935,3 1039,2 686,5 159,0 758,4 599,4 -71,9 
242 RUA S BRAS R 5 1,85 1504,2 1671,3 1409,5 281,5 649 367,5 760,5 
227 RUA PINTO BESSA R 5 1,85 1260,8 1400,9 1059,0 173,5 745 571,5 314,0 
203 RUA GUEDES AZEVEDO R 5 1,85 1554,3 1726,9 1465,1 281,5 645,2 363,7 819,9 
1395 RUA CONSTITUICAO R 5 1,85 1304,9 1449,9 1146,9 226,0 694,3 468,3 452,6 
 
Unit: euros 
 
5 Conclusions 
In this article were carried on some reflections of the consequences that urban planning decisions 
on urban morphologies and building typologies exert on land and real estate economic values, 
considering planning regulations and tools, as well as the behaviours of property agents. 
It was additionally proposed the setting of an urban management information system, and a 
methodology was developed for the computation of surplus-values that accrue from planning 
decisions. It is expected this research contributes to the incorporation of economic issues in 
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territorial plans, simultaneously promoting the private initiative but making sure planning is able to 
keep the social value of land. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
 These include landowners, development agents, promoters and builders, real estate mediators, final owners or 
leaseholders, credit institutions and public authorities. 
2
 Namely in what concerns the great variability of land and real estate prices. 
3
 The surplus values generated by public works are called non-pure. 
4
 Before land enters the competitive market. 
5
 The alternative uses may be housing, trade, industry and equipments. 
6
 The land patrimonial value represents its territorial-base value. 
7
 However, as it was admitted that 60% of a certain area was assigned to the studied use, and only 40% to the 
remaining uses (including public spaces), only 60% of the total income was considered. 
8
 The municipal tax on property is regulated by the decree law nº 287/2003 (the official valuation code) that 
settles the parameters for the computation of reasonable real estate prices/m2, based on the application of 
socially-oriented land policy principles (Pardal, 2006b). 
